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Abstract—We propose a traffic confirmation attack on low-
latency anonymous communication protocols based on computing
robust real-time binary hashes of network traffic flows. Firstly,
we adapt the Coskun-Memon Algorithm to construct hashes that
can withstand network impairments to allow fast matching of
network flows. The resulting attack has a low startup cost and
achieves a true positive match rate of 80% when matching one
flow out of 9000 with less than 2% false positives, showing
traffic confirmation attacks can be highly accurate even when
only part of the network traffic flow is seen. Secondly, we attack
probabilistic padding schemes achieving a match rate of over
90% from 9000 network traffic flows, showing advanced padding
techniques are still vulnerable to traffic confirmation attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet communication traffic is commonly encrypted to
hide its content using TLS. However, TLS encrypted traffic
is vulnerable to traffic analysis since it does not hide packet
metadata, such as the time a packet was sent or received or
the size of the packet.
Low-latency mix networks attempt to provide anonymous
communication by obscuring the flow of traffic through the
network. Intermediate mixing of messages removes sender-
receiver linkability. An Onion Routing (OR) network obscures
sender-receiver linkability in a similar fashion but security is
obtained through route unpredictability; mixing of messages
is not typically required. A client that browses to a website
through an OR network [8] will have their traffic relayed before
it reaches its destination. Each relay only knows where to
send the traffic next, so under the assumption that relays do
not collude with one another, an adversary observing traffic
at a relay will not be able to infer both the origin and
destination of the clients communications. Though low-latency
mix networks and OR networks differ in how they operate,
both are susceptible to timing attacks because communication
patterns are not intentionally delayed for long periods.
We consider a passive traffic confirmation attack, where an
adversary eavesdrops on two ends of the network and aims to
link the sender and receiver of a communication over the OR
network. Research has shown that if an adversary can view
traffic at both the entry and exit relay, traffic confirmation
attacks are possible [9], [11], [14], [15], [19], [21]. However
doubt has been cast upon the efficiency of traffic analysis over
OR networks since attack accuracy is expected to suffer due
to background noise and network conditions. The base rate
fallacy, the cost of exfiltration, processing and storage of data
are expected to be contributing factors that negatively affect
attack accuracy [15]. We present a new traffic confirmation
attack which mitigates some of these fears, where an adversary
can learn a short binary hash representation of a network
flow in real-time and then compare it against a library of
hashes recorded at another location in the network. Because
an adversary only needs to store a short hash per network
traffic flow the attack requires a low storage cost, the hashes
are easy to exfiltrate from network traffic flows and provide
a framework for computationally low cost matching and local
evaluation. Our attack succeeds even when the adversary can
only observe a fraction of the total transmission or when the
network uses probabilistic padding schemes.
II. BACKGROUND & MOTIVATION
Traffic confirmation attacks in low-latency mix networks
are an active area of research [3], [6], [12] and fall in
to two categories, passive and active attacks. In a passive
attack an adversary aims to link a sender and receiver of a
communication by inferring statistical properties of observed
network traffic flows. In an active attack, commonly referred
to as tagging or watermarking, the adversary modifies network
traffic flows introducing patterns that be can observed at
another location in the network, allowing the adversary to de-
anonymize clients using the mix network [24]. Active attacks
can be detected [16] or at least rendered no more powerful
than passive attacks under padding schemes since padding may
remove the signature imposed by the adversary on the flow.
Simple passive attacks such as counting the number of
packets in network flows have been shown to yield strong
results [19]. Levine et al. [11] shows that by dividing flows
in to time windows and counting the packets within the
windows a more powerful attack can be performed. Packet
monitoring at scale becomes challenging due to adversary
bandwidth restraints; Chakravarty et al. [5] showed that large
scale attacks using less fine grained information is possible
by monitoring network flow statistics as captured by servers
such as Cisco’s NetFlow. Note that the possibility of large scale
traffic confirmation attacks is not merely an academic concern.
As of October 2015 all ISPs in Australia must maintain
NetFlow-like data for a minimum of two years [1]. One may
wonder, if the adversary is a nation state or ISP with plenty
of available bandwidth do they need a method for converting
network traffic to short hashes? It has been shown that data
exfiltration is expensive even for an adversary with a lot of
bandwidth to utilize [10], [18]. Data is commonly compressed
before exfiltration; a method for converting traffic signals to
short hashes while preserving the contained information would
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Fig. 1: Architecture of threat model.
greatly improve the speed and amount of data that can be
exfiltrated and subsequently matched.
Deterministic padding in OR networks while offering guar-
antees of security, are usually expensive in terms of latency and
bandwidth overheads [22]. If constant rate padding is applied
with the requirement of no latency overheads, packets must be
injected at a rate less than or equal to the smallest inter-arrival
time between packets. Since short-lived website connections
are bursty in nature, adding constant rate cover traffic is likely
to incur large bandwidth overheads. Probabilistic techniques
such as Adaptive Padding (AP) [20] aim to protect anonymity
by introducing traffic in to statistically unlikely delays between
packets in a flow. This limits the amount of extra bandwidth
required and does not incur any latency costs as packets are
forwarded as soon as they are received. AP uses previously
computed histograms of inter-arrival packet times from website
loads to determine when a packet should be injected. The
AP algorithm consists of two modes, gap and burst. When
a network traffic flow has a natural delay in packets AP enters
gap mode and increases the probability of injecting a dummy
packet. This destroys natural fingerprints created by the gaps
in flows. In burst mode, AP recognizes that traffic is flowing
at a high rate, and so reduces the probability that a dummy
packet will be injected.
We apply our attack to the most popular low-latency OR
network, Tor [8]. Currently packets are sent through the Tor
network using TCP which guarantees reliable transmission.
However TCP flow control has been identified as a major cause
of latency in Tor; there has been suggestions to incorporate the
User Datagram Protocol (UDP) which would reduce queue
lengths on relays and allow for better congestion management
[13], [17]. If the reduction of latency in Tor or the use of VoIP
and similar protocols is desired, it may be prudent to allow
UDP over Tor. In this case packets may be dropped; motivating
our study of attack tolerance when packets are not reliably
transmitted over Tor. We note that Tor only aims to protect
against traffic analysis attacks such as website fingerprinting
[4], [22], it does not aim to protect against traffic confirmation
attacks. Nevertheless, we show that highly accurate traffic
analysis can be performed cheaply and quantify the amount
of anonymity leaked when the full network flow is not seen
and under proposed padding defenses [9] that aim to protect
against traffic analysis.
III. METHODOLOGY
A. Threat Model
We study communications between a client and a website
over an OR network as depicted in Figure 1, where a network
flow passes through three relays before reaching its destination.
The adversary has the capability to record all network traffic in
some local area network, possibly from multiple senders. The
adversary also eavesdrops between an exit relay and a website.
The ultimate goal is to link the network flow observed after
the exit relay to the correct network flow in the LAN observed
before reaching the entry relay. All communications in our
model are sent simultaneously; if only one network flow was
sent and captured during some time period, linking of flows
would be trivial. We assume that there is enough diversity in
the network that the probability of a relay being an entry and
exit for the same network flow is statistically unlikely.
B. Data Collection & Feature Selection
1) Data Collection: We use the publicly available Wang
et al. data set [22] to test our attacks. The data set consists
of 90 instances of 100 sensitive websites that are blocked in
countries such as China, UK and Saudi Arabia. This data set
was collected via Tor which pads all packets to a fixed size of
512-bytes1, so the only metadata from which we can leverage
information is the time a packet was seen and the direction of
the packet.
This data was collected at the client side, to generate
network traffic traces that an adversary would capture server
side we construct an inter-packet delay variation (IPDV) dis-
tribution. The IPDV distribution represents the jitter in the
network between observing a website load at the client side
and observing a website load at the server side. Modifications
are applied to the Wang et al. data set to construct the server
side data set as follows:
• Probability of dropped packet - 1%, 5%, 10% and
30%.
1Commonly referred to as cells.
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• Obfuscation of time stamps - Each packet timestamp
was modified by adding u to it. Where u is randomly
drawn from the experimentally derived IPDV distri-
bution .
The IPDV distribution is constructed through real world
experiments on the Tor network. We set up a simple webpage
hosted on five geo-located Amazon EC2 instances2. For each
of the five instances we loaded the webpage 100 times through
Tor and recorded the packet time arrivals at both client and
sever, giving the inter-packet delay variation that an adversary
can expect between client and server when collecting traces
over Tor. In line with the threat model, our Tor client was
configured to use one exit relay to simulate an adversary
collecting traffic at one exit. Guard relays were not used,
simulating an adversary collecting traffic over some local
network where a client could potentially use any entry node
in the network. We found that although the IPDV distribution
exhibited a high degree of variance, the average value was
close to 0ms and resembled a normal distribution 3.
We decided not to run a live implementation of our attack
over Tor as the application of the experimentally derived IPDV
distribution to the public data set collected over Tor reliably
simulates traffic collected at the server side. If we instead ran
and recorded traffic at an exit relay we would either have to
(1) configure the exit relay so it accepts no other traffic than
our own; this would not accurately capture how the influence
of other traffic in the network affects IPDV, or (2) accept other
connections and filter them out after traffic has been recorded.
Since clients use Tor to preserve their anonymity we decided
against capturing background traffic. Our method of simulating
network traffic instances at the server side has the best of
both worlds, we do not capture other Tor clients traffic but
accurately mimic the delay variations produced by loading a
website load over Tor.
2) Feature Selection: Feature sets are usually constructed
based on some prior assumption of importance that may turn
out to be false and as a consequence degrade the accuracy of
the classifier. Our set of features is designed to be low-level,
meaning we make no assumptions about the importance of
certain features such as concentrations of incoming or outgoing
packets, orderings of packets, and directions of packets.
Once the transmission of a flow has finished, the flow is split in
to N evenly spaced time windows, where N is decided on prior
to computation. The number of packets seen in a time window
is counted and recorded. This information is then used to create
the hash of the network traffic flow. When a network flow
contains fewer packets than the total number of time windows,
we simply discard this network flow - note that this happened
infrequently due to the small time windows chosen.
C. Coskun-Memon Algorithm
We adapt the algorithm from Coskun et al. [7] to compute
the binary hash of a network traffic flow. The algorithm was
originally used to identify matching VoIP flows, but has been
modified since VoIP flows contain both the time and size of
packets.
2Instance were hosted in Oregon, Ireland, Tokyo, Sydney, Sa˜o Paulo.
3Inter-packet delay variation minimum = -1418ms, inter-packet delay vari-
ation average = 21ms, inter-packet delay variation maximum = 1735ms.
Data: network flow, number of time windows N
Result: binary hash of network flow
1 H = [0, 0, ..., 0];
2 Extract number of packets in time windows T0, ..., TN ;
3 for i← 0 to N do
4 if i = 0 then
5 H ← H + [R1(T¯0), ..., Rm(T¯0)];
6 end
7 if i > 0 then
8 B¯i ← Bi −Bi−1;
9 H ← H + B¯i[R1(T¯i), ..., Rm(T¯i)];
10 end
11 h = sign(H)
12 end
Algorithm 1: Computes a binary hash of a network traffic
flow.
Algorithm 1 describes how we compute the binary hash
of a network traffic flow. The algorithm takes a network
traffic flow and computes the cumulative number of packets
in each time window as described in section III-B.. Then it
initializes a list, H, of m integers all set at 0. For each time
window T0, .., TN it extracts the time, T¯i, and the number
of packets in that window, Bi, for i ∈ {0, ..., n}. For every
time window after the first it computes the relative difference
in number of packets seen, B¯i = Bi − Bi−1. For each time
window it projects T¯i on to m pseudo-random bases Ra() 4.
The pseudo-random bases were chosen so that packets with
similar timings will be projected to values on the bases that
are close to one another, resulting in similar hashes for similar
network traffic flows. H is then updated by multiplying each
projection with B¯i. Finally once this has been done for every
time window a hash h is produced by setting h = sign(H)
where:
ha = sign(Ha) =
{
1 if Ha > 0
0 if Ha ≤ 0 for a ∈ {1, ..,m}.
The adversary stores the computed hashes at either end of
the network, which will then be used for comparison.
IV. ATTACK ON UNPADDED MIXES
We evaluate the performance of our attack by performing
experiments simulating a traffic confirmation attack. First we
describe the attack setup and then explain the results of our
experiments.
We assume communication is done over an OR network
and the adversary can observe traffic at some point between the
client and entry relay and again at some point between the exit
relay and destination of traffic. Typically an adversary cannot
expect to compute the same hash since network impairments
such as packet delays will alter the structure of a network flow.
Therefore we test the ability for an adversary to successfully
link flows under simulated network impairments. Since the
4We chose the function
Ra(x) = sin(x+ a)/5 + sin((x+ a) · ra) · ra
where ra is a unique random value between -1 and 1 and a ∈ {1, ...,m}.
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Fig. 2: Traffic confirmation attack accuracy.
dataset consists of 90 instances of each of the 100 websites
we test the ability of the adapted algorithm to both correctly
link a network flow and the ability to correctly link flows from
the same website. This is the problem of matching the correct
network flow out of 9000 network flows.
We compute the Hamming distance between the hash of
the original flow and the hash of the modified flow and mark
it a correct identification if the distance is below a threshold.
We also compute the Hamming distance between the hash of
the original flow and the hash of a random modified flow. If
the distance is below the same threshold we mark this a false
positive match.
A. Results
Figure 2a gives the ROC curve for different probabilities of
dropped packets as the threshold value is changed. Figure 2a
shows that match accuracy decreases as the fraction of dropped
packets increases. This is to be expected, as the total number
of packets shared between the original and modified flows
decreases, the Hamming distance between the two hashes will
rise resulting in fewer true positive matches. Nevertheless, even
if 10% of packets in a network traffic flow are dropped an
adversary can correctly match over 80% of network flows with
only a 2% false positive rate. We note that Tor uses TCP/IP
which guarantees transmission of every packet and so we can
expect our attack to be even more successful on Tor than on
OR networks using unreliable protocols such as UDP.
Figure 2a shows that an adversary can successfully match
hash pairs given some boundary from which to decide if the
match is a success. We now consider a stronger metric for
classification; for each network flow hash we compute the
distance with all modified network flow hashes and check if
the hash with minimum distance is its true pair. Our task is
made more complicated since our dataset contains many flows
that look similar to one another. This is because network flows
were generated by loading a small number of websites. We can
expect any network flow to look similar to 1%5 of the entire
collection of network flows. Under this new metric of success
the following experiment was performed - for each network
traffic flow we recorded the IDs of the modified network
flows6 whose hash had minimum Hamming distance. If any
of the IDs were the true modified network flow counterpart
we considered this a perfect match. If any of the IDs belonged
to the same website we considered this a successful match,
as an adversary would assign the flow to the correct website.
Figure 2b shows the match success rate of linking flows to
flows and flows to websites. The rate of attack degradation
is gradual as the amount of data grows. If the aim of the
attack is to infer which website a client is visiting out of a
list of 50 monitored websites (of 90 instances each) then an
adversary can expect accurate classification over 80% of the
time and drops to 72% when monitoring 100 websites. An
adversary can expect perfect network flow matching 72%-74%
when monitoring 4500 network flows (50 websites) and drops
to 65% when monitoring 9000 network flows (100 websites).
V. ATTACK ON PADDED MIXES
We now consider a traffic confirmation attack over an OR
network that uses Adaptive Padding (AP). All flows that are
seen before the entry relay are padded by AP with padding
removed by some trusted relay in the network before arriving at
the destination of the communication. In the opposite direction
we assume AP is applied before an adversary captures traffic
(either by directly applying AP at the web sever, or at a trusted
590 out of 9000 network traffic flows.
6Hash length = 256-bits, probability of dropped packet = 1% and packet
timestamp obfuscation added.
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bridge) and is removed before an adversary captures traffic at
the end of the circuit.
Data: one unpadded network flow U={Uin,Uout},
padded network flows Pin={Pin0 , ..., Pinl} and
Pout={Pout0 , ..., Poutl}, length of time window k
Result: Match prediction between U and
Pt={Pint ,Poutt} for t ∈ {1, ..., l}
1 for i← in and out do
2 split Ui and Pi in to non-overlapping time windows
of size k;
3 h = [];
4 for m← 0 to l do
5 hm = number of windows with an equal number
of packets between Ui and Pim ;
6 Append hm to h;
7 end
8 Pix where x=index(max(h));
9 end
10 if x is equal for both Pinx and Poutx then
11 Return U = Px
12 end
Algorithm 2: How to compute a match between an unpadded
flow and padded flows.
A. Evaluation
We applied AP to network flows at a padding rate of
54% - using AP with a padding rate over 50% was shown
by Shmatikov et al. [20] to significantly degrade the perfor-
mance of a traffic confirmation attack consisting of correlating
inter-arrival packet times on two links. For both incoming
and outgoing network flows, we created histograms of inter-
arrival packet times by crawling the top 25K alexa sites7.
We then applied AP to each of the 9000 traces in our data
set, to simulate the padded flows collected by the adversary
at the start of communication. We also apply IPDV in the
same fashion as section IV to the 9000 traces to simulate
various network impairments in the OR network, these are
the simulated unpadded flows the adversary collects. Note that
the adversary is only concerned with classifying one unpadded
network flow at any one time.
B. Algorithm
Algorithm 2 presents adapted-SCC, a time window based
traffic confirmation attack based on selective cross-correlation
(SCC) [2]. Adapted-SCC links an unpadded flow with its
padded counterpart. Adapted-SCC is applied by first separating
all observed flows in to incoming or outgoing flows - in our
case, these both consist of 9000 flows. Since AP inserts dummy
packets to gaps in a flow, the padded flow is a super-set of the
original flow. Importantly packet times are preserved in both
padded and unpadded flows (with some minor packet time
variability), allowing for comparison between the number of
bursts in the padded flow and the unpadded flow. Similar to
section III-B., adapted-SCC splits a flow in to non-overlapping
windows of time. The difference is that in section III-B., the
number of time windows is predetermined, so all flows are
split in to an equal number of sections. Here the length of one
7http://www.alexa.com/topsites
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Fig. 3: The average successful match rate between all padded flows
and an unpadded flow with packet jitter added.
time window is predetermined, resulting in different numbers
of time windows for different flows. Each padded flow is given
a score that corresponds to the number of windows which share
an equal number of packets with the unpadded flow. Adapted-
SCC takes the score for both incoming and outgoing padded
flows, if the highest score of the incoming and outgoing flow is
the from the same network traffic flow we consider this padded
flow as the match of the unpadded flow.
C. Results
Figure 3 shows the success rate of adapted-SCC against
AP as the IPDV average is increased for different window
periods. Generally we see that the smaller the window size
the more accurate the attack, since a smaller window time
is able to capture the bursts in flows that were not padded
by AP. With an IPDV average of 200ms an adversary is still
able to match over 50% of streams correctly, the match rate
increases to over 75% when the IPDV average is 100ms. At
the experimentally observed IPDV of 21ms, adapted-SCC is
able to match over 90% of flows correctly. We observed almost
no false positives since adapted-SCC requires both the padded
incoming and outgoing streams to agree to make a prediction.
While this did not happen, we observed a rate of failure of
prediction almost equal to (1 - match prediction rate).
VI. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
We consider the threat model where an adversary collects
9000 hashes of network flows simultaneously on the client
side, and collects flow hashes over time on the server side,
matching against the client side collected data. Tor metrics8
estimate there to be over two million daily users of Tor and so
we estimate that there are enough concurrent connections in
Tor for this model to be realistic. Our results show that traffic
confirmation attacks are possible and accurate at scale. Using
simple packet counting schemes a relatively weak adversary
8https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html
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can build robust short fingerprints of network traffic flows
to perform powerful traffic analysis attacks when only an
incomplete fraction of network traffic is visible or when
probabilistic padding schemes are used. We note that packet
delays were drawn independently from the IPDV distribution,
in reality this will not be the case, packet delays are dependent
on the load of the network at the time of request. As a next
step a live implementation of the attack could be performed on
Tor, but this requires care since we do not wish to capture other
clients traffic yet we need to ensure that background traffic is
present.
We note that while our attack on padding schemes faith-
fully replicates the proposed form of AP applied to an OR
network, AP can only be applied to Tor in its current form in
the forward direction. Relays do not share session keys with
another; session keys are shared between a relay and a client.
Relays do not have the ability to generate multi-hop dummy
cells, instead clients must provide the dummy cells. The ability
for relays to generate dummy cells would also violate Tor’s
integrity checks since the running digest must be synchronized
between client and relays, but a client has no way to check
if a relay has generated new dummy cells. Before AP can
be applied in Tor either a protocol change must be applied
or web servers must be persuaded to generate dummy cells
server side, which is clearly an unrealistic request for standard
websites but may be tolerable for hidden services.
Probabilistic padding defenses that do not purposefully
delay packets are still vulnerable to simple yet powerful
timing attacks. We expect to evaluate next alternative padding
schemes such as dependent link padding [23] or adding in-
tentional delays to packets. As Figure 3 shows, adapted-SCC
becomes ineffective as the volatility of jitter increases. Adding
small random packet delays could foil timing attacks without
incurring a high latency overhead.
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